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Abstract
We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are
characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject
to a single sum resource constraint; 2) each user’s utility in a particular dimension depends on an additive
coupling between the user’s action in the same dimension and the actions of the other users; and 3) each
user’s total utility is the sum of the utilities obtained in each dimension. Familiar examples of such multi-
user environments in communication systems include power control over frequency-selective Gaussian
interference channels and flow control in Jackson networks. In settings where users cannot exchange
messages in real-time, we study how users can adjust their actions based on their local observations. We
derive sufficient conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and the best-response algorithm
converges globally and linearly to the Nash equilibrium. In settings where users can exchange messages
in real-time, we focus on user choices that optimize the overall utility. We provide the convergence
conditions of two distributed action update mechanisms, gradient play and Jacobi update.
Index Terms
Game theory, multi-user communications, Nash equilibrium, best-response dynamics, Gradient play,
Jacobi update, pricing mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a formal framework for describing and analyzing the interactions of multiple
decision-makers. Recently, there has been a surge in research activities that adopt game theoretic tools
to investigate a wide range of modern communications and networking problems, such as flow and
congestion control, network routing, load balancing, power control, peer-to-peer content sharing, etc [1]-
[5]. In resource-constrained communication networks, a user’s utility is usually not only affected by
2its own action but also by the actions taken by all the other users sharing the same resources. Due to
the mutual coupling among users, the performance optimization of multi-user communication systems is
challenging. Depending on the characteristics of different applications, numerous game-theoretical models
and solution concepts have been proposed to characterize the multi-user interactions and optimize the
users’ decisions in communication networks. A variety of game theoretic solutions have been developed
to characterize the resulting performance of the multi-user interactions, including Nash equilibrium (NE)
and Pareto optimality [6].
The majority of the existing game theoretic research works in communication networking applications
usually depend on the specific structures and inter-user coupling of their action sets and utility functions.
By considering or even architecting these specific structures, the associated games become analytically
tractable and possess various important convergence properties. For instance, if users cannot exchange
messages with each other and choose to individually maximize their utilities, to show the existence of and
the convergence to a pure NE, several well-investigated classes of game models, such as concave games,
supermodular games, and potential games, have been extensively applied in various communication
scenarios [6]- [13]. When real-time information exchange is possible, various mechanisms have also
been proposed to enable collaborative users to jointly improve their performance and find the optimum
joint policy. A well-known example is the framework of network utility maximization (NUM) started by
Kelly etc. [14] [15], which has recently been widely adopted to analyze the problems related to fairness
and efficiency in communication networks. Moreover, various distributed resource allocation algorithms
have been developed to implement the NUM framework in an informationally-decentralized manner.
In particular, if a convex NUM problem can be decomposed into several subproblems by introducing
Lagrange multipliers associated with different resource constraints, the global optimum can be computed
using distributed algorithms by deploying message passing mechanisms [16].
Power control is one of the first few communication problems in which researchers started to apply
game theoretic tools to formalize the multi-user interaction and characterize its properties. An interesting
and important topic that has been extensively investigated recently is how to optimize multiple devices’
power allocation when sharing a common frequency-selective interference channel. In [17], Yu et. al.
first defined such a power control game from a game-theoretic perspective, proposed a best-response
algorithm in which all users iteratively update their power allocations using the water-filling solution,
and proved several sufficient conditions under which the algorithm globally converges to a unique pure
NE. Many follow-up papers further establish various sufficient convergence conditions with or without
real-time information exchange for power control in communication networks [18]- [22]. The purpose of
3this paper is to introduce and analyze a general framework that abstracts the common characteristics of
this family of multi-user interaction scenarios, which includes, but is not limited to, the power control
scenario. In particular, the main contributions of this paper are as follows.
First of all, we define the class of Additively Coupled Sum Constrained Games (ACSCG), which
captures and characterizes the key features of several communication and networking applications. In
particular, the central features of ACSCG are: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional strategy that is
subject to a single sum resource constraint; 2) each user’s payoff in each dimension is impacted by an
additive combination of its own action in the same dimension and a function of the other users’ actions;
3) users’ utilities are separable across different dimensions and each user’s total utility is the sum of the
utilities obtained within each dimension.
Second, based on the feasibility of real-time information exchange, we provide the convergence
conditions of various generic distributed algorithms in different scenarios. When no message exchanges
between users are possible and every user maximizes its own utility, it is essential to determine whether a
NE exist and if yes, how to achieve such an equilibrium. In ACSCG, a pure NE exists in ACSCG because
ACSCG belongs to concave games [6] [7]. Our key contribution in this context is that we investigate
the uniqueness of pure NE and consider the best response dynamics to compute the NE. We explore the
properties of the additive coupling among users given the sum constraint and provide several sufficient
conditions under which best response dynamics converges linearly1 to the unique NE, for any set of
feasible initialization with either sequential or parallel updates. We also explain the relationship between
our results and the conditions previously developed in the game theory literature [7] [24]. When users
can collaboratively exchange messages with each other in real-time, we present the sufficient convergence
conditions of two alternative distributed pricing algorithms, including gradient play and Jacobi update, to
coordinate users’ action and improve the overall system efficiency. The proposed convergence conditions
generalize the results that have been previously obtained in [17]- [22] for the multi-user power control
problem and they are immediately applicable to other multi-user applications in communication networks
that fulfill the requirements of ACSCG.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the model of ACSCG. For ACSCG
models, Sections III and IV present several distributed algorithms without and with real-time information
exchanges, respectively, and provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the convergence of the proposed
1A sequence x(k) with limit x∗ is linearly convergent if there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that |x(k)−x∗| ≤ c|x(k−1)−x∗|
for k sufficiently large [23].
4algorithms. Section V presents the numerical examples and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. GAME MODEL
In this section, we introduce some basic definitions from the theory of strategic games to characterize
the multi-user interaction, define the model of ACSCG, and present some illustrative examples for the
class of ACSCG.
A. Strategic Games, Nash equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality
A strategic game is a suitable model for the analysis of a game where all users act independently and
simultaneously according to their own self-interests and with no or limited a priori knowledge of the other
users’ strategies. This can be formally defined as a tuple Γ = 〈N ,A, u〉. In particular, N = {1, 2, . . . , N}
is the set of decision makers. Define A to be the joint action set A = ×n∈NAn, with An ⊆ RK being
the action set available for user n. The vector utility function u = ×n∈Nun is a mapping from the
individual users’ joint action set to real numbers, i.e. u : A → RN . In particular, un(a) : A → R is the
utility of the nth user that generally depends on the strategies a = (an, a−n) of all users, where an ∈ An
denotes a feasible action of user n, and a−n = ×m6=nam is a vector of the actions of all users except
n. We also denote by A−n = ×m6=nAm the joint action set of all users except n. To capture the multi-
user performance tradeoff, the utility region is defined as U = {(u1(a), . . . , uN (a))| ∃ a ∈ A}. Various
game theoretic solutions, such as NE and Pareto optimality, were developed to characterize the resulting
performance [6]. Significant research efforts have been devoted in the literature to constructing operational
algorithms in order to achieve NE and Pareto optimality in various games with special structures of action
set An and utility function un.
1) Nash equilibrium: definition, existence, and convergence: To avoid the overhead associated with
exchanging information in real-time, network designers may prefer fully decentralized solutions in which
the participating users simply compete against other users by choosing actions an ∈ An to selfishly
maximize their individual utility functions un(an, a−n), given the actions a−n ∈ A−n. Most of these
approaches focus on investigating the existence and properties of NE. NE is defined to be an action
profile (a∗1, a∗2, . . . , a∗N ) with the property that for every player, it satisfies un(a∗n, a∗−n) ≥ un(an, a∗−n) for
all an ∈ An, i.e. given the other users’ actions, no user can increase its utility alone by changing its action.
For an extensive discussion of the methodologies studying the existence, uniqueness, and convergence
of various equilibria in communication networks, we refer the readers to [25]. Many of the well-known
results rely on specific structural properties of action set A and utility function u in the investigated
5multi-user interactions. For example, to establish the existence of and convergence to a pure NE, we can
examine whether A and u satisfy the conditions of concave games, supermodular game, potential game,
etc. Specifically, to apply the existence result of a pure NE in concave games [6] [7], we need to check
the following conditions: i) each player’s action set An is convex and compact; and ii) the utility function
un(an, a−n) is continuous in a and quasi-concave2 in an for any fixed a−n. As additional examples of
games that guarantee the convergence to NE, it is well-known that, in supermodular games [8] [10] and
potential games [12] [13], the best response dynamics can be used to search for a pure NE. Suppose
that utility function un is twice continuously differentiable, ∀n ∈ N . If An is a compact subset of R (or
more generally An is a nonempty and compact sublattice3 of RK ), ∀n ∈ N , establishing that game Γ is
a supermodular game is equivalent to showing that un satisfies
∀(m,n) ∈ N 2,m 6= n, ∂
2un
∂an∂am
≥ 0. (1)
If action set A in game Γ is an interval of real numbers, we can show that game Γ is a potential game
by verifying
∀(m,n) ∈ N 2,m 6= n, ∂
2(un − um)
∂an∂am
= 0. (2)
2) Pareto optimality and network utility maximization: It is important to note that operating at a Nash
equilibrium will generally limit the performance of the user itself as well as that of the entire network,
because the available network resources are not always effectively exploited due to the conflicts of interest
occurring among users. As opposed to the NE-based approaches, there exists a large body of literature
that focuses on studying how users can jointly improve the system performance by optimizing a certain
common objective function f(u1(a), u2(a), . . . , uN (a)). This function represents the fairness rule based
on which the system-wide resource allocation is performed. Different objective functions, e.g. sum utility
maximization in which f(u1(a), u2(a), . . . , uN (a)) =
∑N
n=1 un(a), can provide reasonable allocation
outcomes by jointly considering fairness and efficiency. A profile of actions is Pareto optimal if there is
no other profile of actions that makes every user at least as well off and at least one user strictly better
off.
The majority of these approaches focus on studying how to efficiently or distributedly find the optimum
joint policy. There exists a large body of literature that investigates how to compute Pareto optimal
2A real-valued function f is quasi-concave if domf is convex and {x ∈ domf |f(x) ≥ α} is convex for all α.
3A real K-dimensional set V is a sublattice of RK if for any two elements a, b ∈ V , the component-wise minimum, a ∧ b,
and the component-wise maximum, a ∨ b, are also in V .
6solutions in large-scale networks where centralized solutions are infeasible. Numerous convergence results
have been obtained for various generic distributed algorithms. An important example is the NUM
framework that develops distributed algorithms to solve network resource allocation problems [15]. The
majority of the results in the existing NUM literature are based on convex optimization theory, in which the
investigated problems share the following structures: the objective function f(u1(a), u2(a), . . . , uN (a)) is
convex4, inequality resource constraint functions are convex, and equality resource constraint functions are
affine. It is well-known that, for convex optimization problems, users can collaboratively exchange price
signals that reflect the “cost” for consuming the constrained resources and the Pareto optimal allocation
that maximizes the network utility can be determined in a fully distributed manner [16].
Summarizing, these general structural results without and with real-time message exchange turn out
to be very useful when analyzing various multi-user interactions in communication networks. Numerous
existing works are devoted to constructing or shaping the multi-user coupling such that it fits into these
frameworks and the corresponding generic solutions can be directly applied. In the remaining part of this
paper, we will derive several structural results for a particular type of multi-user interaction scenario.
B. Additively Coupled Sum Constrained Games
In this subsection, we present the definition of ACSCG and subsequently, we present several exemplary
multi-user scenarios which appertain to this new class of game.
Definition 1: A multi-user interaction Γ = 〈N ,A, u〉 is a ACSCG if it satisfies the following assump-
tions:
A1: ∀n ∈ N , action set An ⊆ RK is defined to be5
An =
{
(a1n, a
2
n, · · · , aKn )
∣∣ akn ∈ [aminn,k , amaxn,k ] and
K∑
k=1
akn ≤Mn
}
. (3)
A2: There exist hkn : R → R, fkn : A−n →R, and gkn : A−n →R, k = 1, . . . ,K, such that
un(a) =
K∑
k=1
[
hkn
(
akn + f
k
n(a−n)
)− gkn(a−n)], (4)
for all a ∈ A and n ∈ N . hkn(·) is an increasing, twice differentiable, and strictly concave function and
fkn(·) and gkn(·) are both twice differentiable.
4f : Rn → R is convex if domf is a convex set and f(θx+ (1− θ)y) ≤ θf(x) + (1− θ)f(y), ∀x, y ∈ domf, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
5We consider a sum constraint throughout the paper rather than a weighted-sum constraint, because a weighted-sum constraint
can be easily converted to a sum constraint by rescaling An. Besides, we nontrivially assume that
∑K
k=1 a
max
n,k ≥Mn.
7The ACSCG model defined by assumptions A1 and A2 covers a broad class of multi-user interactions.
Assumption A1 indicates that each player’s action set is a K-dimensional vector set and its action vector
is sum-constrained. This represents the communication scenarios in which each user needs to determine
its multi-dimensional action in various channels or networks while the total amount of resources it can
consume is constrained. Assumption A2 implies that each user’s utility is separable and can be represented
by the summation of concave functions hkn minus “penalty” functions gkn across the K dimensions. In
particular, within each dimension, the input of hkn is an additive combination of user n’s action akn and
function fkn(a−n) that depends on the remaining users’ joint action a−n. Since akn only appears in the
concave function hkn, it implies that each user’s utility is concave in its own action, i.e. diminishing
returns per unit of user n’s invested action an, which is common for many application scenarios in
communication networks.
Summarizing, the key features of the game model defined by A1 and A2 include: each user’s action
is subject to a sum constraint; users’ utilities are impacted by additive combinations of akn and fkn(a−n)
through concave functions hkn. Therefore, we term the game Γ that satisfies assumptions A1 and A2
as ACSCG. In the following section, we present several illustrative multi-user interaction examples that
belong to ACSCG.
C. Examples of ACSCG
We present four examples that satisfy assumptions A1 and A2 and belong to ACSCG. The details of
functions hkn(·), fkn(·) and gkn(·) in each example are summarized in Table I. For each example, Table I
also summarizes the applicable convergence conditions that will be provided in the remaining parts of
the paper.
Example 1: We first consider a simple two-user game with two-dimension action spaces, i.e. N =
K = 2. The utility functions are given by6
un(a) = − exp
{
−a1n −
√
(a1−n)
2 + 1 +
√
(a2−n)
2 + 1
}
− exp
{
−a2n +
√
(a1−n)
2 + 1−
√
(a2−n)
2 + 1
}
,
for n = 1, 2. The resource constraints are
∑2
k=1 a
k
n ≤Mn in which Mn > 0 and akn ≥ 0 for ∀n, k.
Example 2: (Power control in frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel [17] [20]) There are
N transmitter and receiver pairs in the system. The entire frequency band is divided into K frequency
bins. In frequency bin k, the channel gain from transmitter i to receiver j is denoted as Hkij , where k =
6In this example, since there are only two users, the subindex −n denotes the user but n.
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EXAMPLES 1-4 AS ACSCG.
Examples fkn(a−n) hkn(x) gkn(a−n)
Convergence
conditions
Example 1
f1n(a−n) =
√
(a1−n)
2 + 1−
√
(a2−n)
2 + 1
−e−x 0 (C4)
f2n(a−n) =
√
(a2−n)
2 + 1−
√
(a1−n)
2 + 1
Example 2
∑
m6=n
Hkmn
Hknn
P km log2(σ
k
n +H
k
nnx) log2(σ
k
n +
∑
m6=n
HkmnP
k
m) (C1)-(C8)
Example 3
∑
m6=n
υkmn
υknn
ψkm − 1
µkn−υ
k
nnx
0 (C1)-(C8)
Example 4
∑
m6=n
(
K∑
j=1
γ(k−j)Hkmn
Hknn
P km) log2(σ
k
n +H
k
nnx) log2
(
σkn +H
k
nnf
k
n(a−n)
) (C4)-(C8)
1, 2, · · · ,K. Similarly, denote the noise power spectral density (PSD) that receiver n experiences as σkn and
player n’s transmit PSD as P kn . The action of user n is to select its transmit power Pn = [P 1n P 2n · · ·PKn ]
subject to its power constraint: ∑Kk=1 P kn ≤ Pmaxn . For a fixed Pn, if treating its interference as noise,
user n can achieve the following data rate:
rn(P) =
K∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
HknnP
k
n
σkn +
∑
m6=nH
k
mnP
k
m
)
=
K∑
k=1
(
log2(σ
k
n +
N∑
m=1
HkmnP
k
m)− log2(σkn +
∑
m6=n
HkmnP
k
m)
)
.
(5)
Example 3: (Delay minimization in Jackson Networks [26]) As an additional example, we consider
a network of N nodes. A Poisson stream of external packets arrive at node n with rate ψn and the
input stream is split into K traffic classes, which are individually served by exponential servers. Denote
node n’s input rate and service rate for class k as ψkn and µkn respectively. Therefore, the action of
node n is to determine the rates for different traffic classes Ψn = [ψ1n ψ2n · · ·ψKn ] and the total rate
is subject to the minimum rate constraint: ∑Kk=1 ψkn ≥ ψminn . The packets of the same traffic class
constitute a Jackson network in which Markovian routing is adopted: packets of class k completing
service at node m are routed to node n with probability rkmn or exit the network with probability
rkm0 = 1 −
∑N
n=1 r
k
mn. Denote the arrival rate for class k at node n as ηkn. By Jackson’s Theorem,
we have ηkn = ψkn +
∑N
m=1 η
k
mr
k
mn, n = 1, 2, · · · ,K. Denote [Rk]mn = rknm, Υk = (I − Rk)−1, and
υkmn = [Υ
k]nm. Equivalently, we have ηkn =
∑N
m=1 υ
k
mnψ
k
m. Each node aims to minimize its total M/M/1
9queueing delay incurred by accommodating its traffic:
dn(Ψ) =
K∑
k=1
1
µkn −
∑N
m=1 υ
k
mnψ
k
m
. (6)
Example 3 can be shown to be a special case of ACSCG by slightly transforming the action sets and
utilities. We can define user n’s action as −Ψn. For user n, the sum constraint becomes
∑K
k=1−ψkn ≤
−ψminn and minimizing dn(Ψ) is equivalent to maximizing −dn(Ψ).
Example 4: (Asynchronous transmission in digital subscriber lines network [19]) The basic setting
of this example is similar to that of Example 2 except that inter-carrier interference (ICI) exist among
different frequency bins. Due to the loss of the orthogonality, the interference that user n experiences in
frequency bin k is
fkn(P−n) =
∑
m6=n
( K∑
j=1
γ(k − j)HjmnP jm
)
, (7)
in which γ(j) is the ICI coefficient that represents the relative interference transmitted signal in a particular
frequency bin generates to its jth neighbor bin. In particular, it takes the form
γ(j) =


1, if j = 0
2
K2 sin2( pi
K
j)
, −K2 ≤ j ≤ K2 j 6= 0.
(8)
It satisfies the symmetric and circular properties, i.e. γ(−j) = γ(j) = γ(K − j). User n’s achievable
rate in the presence of ICI is given by
rn(P) =
K∑
k=1
log2
[
1 +
HknnP
k
n
σkn +
∑
m6=n
(∑K
j=1 γ(k − j)HjmnP jm
)
]
. (9)
D. Issues related to ACSCG
Since the ACSCG model represents a good abstraction of numerous multi-user resource allocation
problems, we aim to investigate the convergence properties of various distributed algorithms in ACSCG
without and with real-time message passing.
ACSCG is a concave game [6] [7] and therefore, it admits at least one pure NE. In practice, we want
to provide the sufficient conditions under which best response dynamics provably and globally converges
to a pure NE. However, the existing literature, e.g. the diagonal strict concavity (DSC) conditions in
[7] and the supermodular game theory [8]- [10], does not provide such convergence conditions for the
general ACSCG model. For example, the DSC conditions developed for general concave games do not
guarantee the convergence of best response dynamics [7]. Even if the utility functions in ACSCG possess
the supermodular type structure, due to the sum constraint, the action set of each user is generally not a
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sublattice7 of RK . Therefore, the convergence results based on supermodular games cannot be directly
applied in ACSCG. On the other hand, if we want to maximize the sum utility by enabling real-time
message passing among users, we also note that, the utility un is not necessarily jointly concave in a
because of the existence of gkn(·). Therefore, the existing algorithms developed for the convex NUM are
not immediately applicable either.
In fact, a unique feature of the ACSCG is that different users’ actions are additively coupled in
hkn(·) and each user’s action space is sum-constrained. In the following sections, we will fully explore
these specific structures and address the convergence properties of various distributed algorithms in two
different scenarios. Specifically, Section III investigates the scenarios in which each user n can only
observe {fkn(a−n)}Kk=1 and cannot exchange any information with any other user. Section IV focuses on
the scenarios in which each user n is able to announce and receive information in real-time to and from
the remaining users about ∂un(a)∂akm and
∂um(a)
∂akn
, ∀m 6= n, k = 1, . . . ,K.
III. SCENARIO I: NO MESSAGE EXCHANGE AMONG USERS
In communication scenarios where users cannot exchange messages to achieve coordination, the
participating users can simply choose actions to selfishly maximize their individual utility functions
un(a) without taking into account the utility degradation caused to the other users. In particular, each
user individually solves the following optimization program:
max
an∈An
un(a). (10)
The steady state outcome of such a multi-user interaction is usually characterized as a NE, at which
given the other users’ actions, no user can increase its utility alone by unilaterally changing its action.
It is worth pointing out that, since there is no coordination signal among users, NE generally does not
lead to a Pareto-optimal solution. Section IV will discuss distributed algorithms in which users exchange
coordination signals in order to improve the system efficiency.
A. Properties of Best Response Dynamics in ACSCG
To better understand the key properties of the ACSCG, in this subsection, we first focus on the scenarios
in which fkn(a−n) is the linear combination of the remaining users’ action in the same dimension k, i.e.
fkn(a−n) =
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m (11)
7In supermodular games, for each player, the action set is a nonempty and compact sublattice of RK . We can verify that
with the sum constraint, An is usually not a sublattice of RK by taking the component-wise maximum.
11
and F kmn ∈ R, ∀m,n, k. Specifically, both Example 2 and 3 in Table I belong to this category. In Section
III-B, we will extend the results derived for the functions fkn(a−n) defined in (11) to general fkn(a−n).
Since hkn(·) is concave, the objective in (10) is a concave function in akn when the other users’ actions
a−n are fixed. To find the globally optimal solution of the problem in (10), we can first form its Lagrangian
Ln(an, λ) = un(a) + λ(Mn −
K∑
k=1
akn), (12)
in which akn ∈ [aminn,k , amaxn,k ]. By taking the first derivatives of (12), we have
∂Ln(an, λ)
∂akn
=
∂hkn(a
k
n +
∑
m6=n F
k
mna
k
m)
∂akn
− λ = 0. (13)
Denote
lkn(a−n, λ) ,
[{∂hkn
∂x
}−1
(λ)−
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
]amaxn,k
aminn,k
, (14)
in which
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1 is the inverse function8 of ∂hkn∂x and [x]ab = max{min{x, a}, b}. The optimal solution
of (10) is given by a∗kn = lkn(a−n, λ∗), where the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ is chosen to satisfy the sum
constraint
∑K
k=1 a
∗k
n =Mn.
We define the best response operator Bkn(·) as
Bkn(a−n) = l
k
n(a−n, λ
∗). (15)
We consider the dynamic adjustment process in which users revise their actions over time based on
their observations about their opponents. A well-known candidate for such adjustment processes is the
so-called best response dynamics. In the best response algorithm, each user updates its action using the
best response strategy that maximizes its utility function in (4). We consider two types of update orders,
including sequential update and parallel update. Specifically, in sequential update, individual players
iteratively optimize in a circular fashion with respect to their own actions while keeping the actions of
their opponents fixed. Formally, at stage t, user n chooses its action according to
ak,tn = B
k
n([a
t
1, . . . ,a
t
n−1,a
t−1
n+1, . . . ,a
t−1
N ]). (16)
On the other hand, players adopting the parallel update revise their actions at stage t according to
ak,tn = B
k
n(a
t−1
−n ). (17)
We obtain several sufficient conditions under which best response dynamics converges. Similar con-
vergence conditions are proved in [18]- [20] for Example 2 in which hkn(x) = log2(σkn + Hknnx). We
8If ∄ x = x∗ such that ∂h
k
n
∂x
|x=x∗ = λ, we let
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1
(λ) = −∞.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON AMONG CONDITIONS (C1)-(C6).
Conditions Assumptions about fkn(a−n) hkn(x) Measure of residual error at+1n − atn Contraction factor
(C1) (11) A2 1-norm 2ρ(Tmax)
(C2)
(11) and F kmn have
A2 1-norm ρ(Tmax)
the same sign for ∀k,m 6= n
(C3) (11) (20) weighted Euclidean norm ρ(Smax)
(C4) general A2 1-norm 2ρ(T¯max)
(C5)
∂fkn(a−n)
∂ak
′
m
have the same sign
A2 1-norm ρ(T¯max)
for ∀a ∈ A, k, k′,m 6= n
(C6) general (20) weighted Euclidean norm ρ(S¯max)
consider more general functions hkn(·) and further extend the convergence conditions in [18]- [20]. The
key differences among all the sufficient conditions which will be provided in this section are summarized
in Table II.
1) General hkn(·): The first sufficient condition is developed for the general cases in which the functions
hkn(·) in the utilities un(·) are specified in assumption A2. Define
[Tmax]mn ,

 maxk |F
k
mn|, if m 6= n
0, otherwise.
(18)
and let ρ(Tmax) denote the spectral radius of the matrix Tmax.
Theorem 1: If
ρ(Tmax) < 1
2
, (C1)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A with either sequential or parallel updates.
Proof : This theorem is proved by showing that the best response dynamics defined in (16) and (17)
is a contraction mapping under (C1). See Appendix A for details. 
In multi-user communication applications, it is common to have games of strategic complements (or
strategic substitutes), i.e. the marginal returns to any one component of the player’s action rise with
increases (or decreases) in the components of the competitors’ actions [27]. For instance, in Examples 2
and 4, increasing user n’s transmitted power creates stronger interference to the other users and decreases
their marginal achievable rates. Similarly, in Example 3, increasing node n’s input traffic rate congests
all the servers in the network and increases the marginal queueing delay. Mathematically, if un is twice
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differentiable, strategic complementarities (or strategic substitutes) can be described as
∂2un(an,a−n)
∂ajn∂akm
≥ 0, ∀m 6= n, j, k, (or ∂
2un(an,a−n)
∂ajn∂akm
≤ 0, ∀m 6= n, j, k). (19)
We can verify that Examples 2, 3, and 4 are games with strategic substitutes. For the ACSCG models
that exhibit strategic complementarities (or strategic substitutes), the following theorem further relaxes
condition (C1).
Theorem 2: Let Γ be an ACSCG with strategic complementarities (or strategic substitutes), i.e. F kmn ≤
0, ∀k,m 6= n, (or F kmn ≥ 0, ∀k,m 6= n). If
ρ(Tmax) < 1, (C2)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A with either sequential or parallel updates.
Proof : This theorem is proved by adapting the proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix B. 
Remark 1: (Implications of conditions (C1) and (C2)) Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 give sufficient con-
ditions for best response dynamics to globally converge to a unique fixed point. Specifically, maxk |F kmn|
can be regarded as a measure of the strength of the mutual coupling between user m and n. The intuition
behind (C1) and (C2) is that, the weaker the coupling among different users is, the more likely that best
response dynamics converges. Consider the extreme case in which F kmn = 0,∀k,m 6= n. Since each
user’s best response is not impacted by the remaining users’ action a−n, the convergence is immediately
achieved after a single best-response iteration. If no restriction is imposed on F kmn, Theorem 1 specifies a
mutual coupling threshold under which best response dynamics provably converge. The proof of Theorem
1 can be intuitively interpreted as follows. We regard every best response update as the users’ joint attempt
to approach the NE. Due to the linear coupling structure in (11), user n’s best response in (14) contains
a term
∑
m6=n F
k
mna
k
m that is a linear combination of a−n. As a result, the residual error
∣∣at+1n − atn∣∣1,
which is the 1-norm distance between the updated action profile at+1n and the current action profile atn,
can be upper-bounded using linear combinations of
∣∣atm−at−1m ∣∣1 in which m 6= n. Recall that F kmn can be
either positive or negative. We also note that, if atm 6= at−1m , atm−at−1m contains both positive and negative
terms due to the sum-constraint. In the worst case, the distance
∣∣at+1n − atn∣∣1 is maximized if {F kmn}
and
{
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
}
are co-phase multiplied and additively summed, i.e. F kmn
(
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
) ≥ 0, for
∀k = 1, . . . ,K,m 6= n. After an iteration, all users except n contributes to user n’s residual error at stage
t + 1 up to
∑
m6=n 2maxk
∣∣F kmn∣∣∣∣atm − at−1m ∣∣1. Under condition (C1), it is guaranteed that the residual
error contracts with respect to the special norm defined in (67). Theorem 2 focuses on the situations in
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which the signs of F kmn are the same, ∀m 6= n, k. In this case,
{
F kmn
}
and
{
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
}
cannot be
co-phase multiplied. Therefore, the region of convergence enlarges and hence, condition (C2) stated in
Theorem 2 is weaker than condition (C1) in Theorem 1.
Remark 2: (Relation to the results in references [18]- [20]) Similar to [18] [19], our proofs choose 1-
norm as the distance measure for the residual errors at+1n −atn after each best-response iteration. However,
by manipulating the inequalities in a different way, condition (C2) is more general than the results in [18]
[19], where they require maxk F kmn < 1N−1 . Interestingly, condition (C2) recovers the result obtained in
[20] where it is proved by choosing the Euclidean norm as the distance measure for the residual errors
at+1n − atn after each best-response iteration. However, the approach in [20] using the Euclidean norm
only applies to the scenarios in which hkn(·) is a logarithmic function. We prove that condition (C2)
applies to any hkn(·) that is increasing and strictly concave.
2) A special class of hkn(·): In addition to conditions (C1) and (C2), we also develop a sufficient
convergence condition for a family of utility functions parameterized by a negative number θ. In particular,
hkn(·) satisfies9
hkn(x) =

 log(α
k
n + F
k
nnx), if θ = −1,
(αkn+F
k
nnx)
θ+1
θ+1 , if −1 < θ < 0 or θ < −1.
(20)
and αkn ∈ R and F knn > 0. The interpretation of this type of utilities has been addressed in [28]. It is shown
that varying the parameter θ leads to different types of fairness across αkn + F knn(akn +
∑
m6=n F
k
mna
k
m)
for all k. In particular, θ = −1 corresponds to the proportional fairness; if θ = −2, then harmonic mean
fairness; and if θ = −∞, then max-min fairness. We can see that, Examples 2 and 3 are special cases
of this type of utility functions. In these cases, best response dynamics in equation (14) is reduced to
lkn(a−n, λ) =
[( 1
F knn
)1+ 1
θλ
1
θ − α
k
n
F knn
−
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
]amaxn,k
aminn,k
, (21)
Define
[Smax]mn ,


∑
K
k=1
(F kmm)
1+ 1
θ
∑
K
k=1
(F knn)
1+ 1
θ
maxk
{
|F kmn|
(
F knn
F kmm
)1+ 1
θ
}
, if m 6= n
0, otherwise.
(22)
For the class of utility functions in (20), Theorem 3 gives a sufficient condition that guarantees the
convergence of the best response dynamics defined in (21).
9If αkn + F knnx ≤ 0, we let hkn(x) = −∞. We assume for this class of hkn(·) that for ∀a−n ∈ A−n, there exists an ∈ An
such that αkn + F knnx > 0 for ∀n, k.
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Theorem 3: For hkn(·) defined in (20), if
ρ(Smax) < 1, (C3)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A and with either sequential or parallel updates.
Proof : It can be proved by showing that the best response dynamics defined in (21) is a contraction
mapping with respect to the weighted Euclidean norm. See Appendix C for details. 
Remark 3: (Relation between conditions (C3) and the results in reference [20]) For aforementioned
Example 2, Scutari et al. established in [20] a sufficient condition under which the iterative water-
filling algorithm converges. The iterative water-filling algorithm essentially belongs to best response
dynamics. Specifically, in [20], Shannon’s formula leads to θ = −1 and cross channel coefficients satisfy
F kmn ≥ 0,∀k,m 6= n. Equation (21) reduces to the water-filling formula
lkn(a−n, λ) =
[ 1
λ
− α
k
n
F knn
−
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
]amaxn,k
aminn,k
, (23)
and [Smax]mn = maxk F kmn. By choosing the weighted Euclidean norm as the distance measure for the
residual errors at+1n − atn after each best-response iteration, Theorem 3 generalizes the results in [20] for
the family of utility functions defined in (20).
Remark 4: (Relation between conditions (C1), (C2) and (C3)) The connections and differences between
conditions (C1), (C2) and (C3) are summarized in Table II. We have addressed the implications of (C1)
and (C2) in Remark 1. Now we discuss their relation with (C3). First of all, condition (C1) is proposed for
general hkn(·) and condition (C3) is proposed for the class of utility functions defined in (20). However,
Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 individually establish the fact that best response dynamics is a contraction map
by selecting different vector and matrix norms. Therefore, in general, (C1) and (C3) do not immediately
imply each other. Note that [Smax]mn ≤ ζmn ·maxk |F kmn| in which ζmn satifies
ζmn =
∑K
k=1(F
k
mm)
1+ 1
θ∑K
k=1(F
k
nn)
1+ 1
θ
·max
k
(F knn)
1+ 1
θ
(F kmm)
1+ 1
θ
∈
[
1,
maxk(F
k
nn/F
k
mm)
1+ 1
θ
mink(F knn/F
k
mm)
1+ 1
θ
]
. (24)
The physical interpretation of ζmn is the similarity between the preferences of user m and n across the
total K dimensions of their action spaces. Recall that both Smax and Tmax are non-negative matrices and
Smax is element-wise less than or equal to maxm6=n ζmnTmax. By the property of non-negative matrix
and condition (C1), we can conclude ρ(Smax) ≤ ρ(maxm6=n ζmnTmax) < maxm6=n ζmn2 . The relation
between (C1) and (C3) is pictorially illustrated in Fig. 1. Specifically, if users have similar preference in
their available actions and the upper bound of ζmn that measures the difference of their preferences is
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C1 C1
C3 C3
In general
Fig. 1. Relation between (C1) and (C3).
below the following threshold:
maxk,m6=n(F
k
nn/F
k
mm)
1+ 1
θ
mink,m6=n(F knn/F
k
mm)
1+ 1
θ
< 2, (25)
we know that (C1) implies (C3) in this situation because ρ(Smax) < maxm,n ζmn · ρ(Tmax) < 2 · 12 = 1.
We also would like to point out that, the LHS of (25) is a function of θ and the LHS ≡ 1 if θ = −1.
When θ = −1, Tmax coincides with Smax. Mathematically, in this case, (C3) is actually more general
than (C2), because it still holds even if coefficients F kmn have different signs.
B. Extensions to General fkn(·)
As a matter of fact, the results above can be extended to the more general situations in which fkn(·) is
a nonlinear differentiable function, ∀n, k and its input a−n consists of the remaining users’ action from
all the dimensions. Accordingly, equation (14) becomes
lkn(a−n, λ) ,
[{∂hkn
∂x
}−1
(λ)− fkn(a−n)
]amaxn,k
aminn,k
. (26)
The conclusions in Theorem 1, 2, and 3 can be further extended as Theorem 4, and 5, 6 that are listed
below. We only provide the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix D. The detailed proofs of Theorem 5 and
6 are omitted because they can be proven similarly as Theorem 4.
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For general fkn(·), we denote
[T¯max]mn ,


maxa∈A,k′
∑K
k=1
∣∣∣∂fkn(a−n)∂ak′m
∣∣∣, if m 6= n
0, otherwise.
(27)
Besides, for hkn(·) defined in (20), we define
[S¯max]mn ,


∑
K
k=1
(F kmm)
1+ 1
θ
∑
K
k=1
(F knn)
1+ 1
θ
maxa∈A,k′
{∑K
k=1
∣∣∣∂fkn(a−n)∂ak′m
∣∣∣( F k′nnF k′mm
)1+ 1
θ
}
, if m 6= n
0, otherwise.
(28)
Theorem 4: If
ρ(T¯max) <
1
2
, (C4)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A with either sequential or parallel updates.
Proof : This theorem can be proved by combining the proof of Theorem 1 and the mean value theorem
for vector-valued functions. See Appendix D for details. 
Similarly as in Theorem 2, for the general ACSCG models that exhibit strategic complementarities (or
strategic substitutes), we can further relax condition (C4).
Theorem 5: For Γ with strategic complementarities (or strategic substitutes), i.e. ∂fkn(a−n)
∂ak′m
≥ 0,∀m 6=
n, k, k′, a ∈ A, (or ∂fkn(a−n)
∂ak′m
≤ 0,∀m 6= n, k, k′, a ∈ A), if
ρ(T¯max) < 1, (C5)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A with either sequential or parallel updates.
Theorem 6: For hkn(·) defined in (20), if
ρ(S¯max) < 1, (C6)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and best response dynamics converges linearly to the NE, for
any set of initial conditions belonging to A with either sequential or parallel updates.
Remark 5: (Implications of conditions (C4), (C5), and (C6)) Based on the mean value theorem, we
know that the upper bound of the additive sum of first derivatives
∑K
k=1
∣∣∣∂fkn(a−n)∂ak′m
∣∣∣ governs the maximum
impact that user m’s action can make over user n’s utility. As a result, Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and
Theorem 6 indicate that
∑K
k=1
∣∣∣∂fkn(a−n)∂ak′m
∣∣∣ can be used to develop similar sufficient conditions for the
global convergence of best response dynamics. Table II summarizes the connections and differences
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among all the aforementioned conditions from (C1) to (C6). We can verify that, for the linear function
fkn(·) that is defined in (11) and studied in Section III-A, ∀a ∈ A,m 6= n, it satisfies
∂fkn(a−n)
∂ak′m
=

 F
k
mn, if k′ = k
0, otherwise.
(29)
In addition, we can see that, in Example 4, fkn(·) is actually an affine function with
∂fkn(P−n)
∂P k′m
=

 γ(k − k
′)Hk
′
mn, if k′ = k
0, otherwise.
(30)
and S¯max is reduced to
[S¯max]mn ,

 maxk′
∑K
k=1 γ(k − k′)Hk
′
mn, if m 6= n
0, otherwise.
(31)
As an immediate result of Theorem 6, we have the following corollary which specifies a sufficient condi-
tion that guarantees the convergence of the iterative water-filling algorithm for asynchronous transmissions
in multi-carrier systems [19].
Corollary 1: In Example 4, if the matrix S¯max defined in (31) satisfies
ρ(S¯max) < 1, (32)
then there exists a unique NE in game Γ and the iterative water-filling algorithm converges linearly to
the NE, for any set of initial conditions belonging to A and with either sequential or parallel updates.
Remark 6: (Impact of sum constraints) An interesting phenomenon that can be observed from the
analysis above is that, the convergence condition may depend on the maximum constraints {Mn}Nn=1.
This differs from the observation in [20] that the presence of the transmit power and spectral mask
constraints does not affect the convergence capability of the iterative water-filling algorithm. This is
because when functions fkn(a−n) are affine, e.g. in Example 2, 3, and 4, the elements in T¯
max
and
S¯max are independent of the values of {Mn}Nn=1. Therefore, (C1)-(C6) are independent of Mn for affine
fkn(a−n). However, for non-linear fkn(a−n), the values of {Mn}Nn=1 specify the range of users’ joint
feasible action set A, and this will affect T¯max and S¯max accordingly. In other words, in the presence
of non-linearly coupled fkn(a−n), convergence may depend on the players’ maximum sum constraints
{Mn}Nn=1.
C. Connections to the Results of Rosen [7] and Gabay [24]
In [7], Rosen proposed a continuous-time gradient projection based iterative algorithm to obtain a pure
NE under the assumption of DSC conditions. Here we present a discrete version of the algorithm in [7],
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named “gradient play”. Specifically, at stage t, each user first determines the gradient of its own utility
function un(an,at−1−n ). Then each user updates its action atn using gradient projection according to
a
′k,t
n = a
k,t−1
n + κn
∂un(an,a
t−1
−n )
∂akn
(33)
and
atn = [a
1,t
n a
2,t
n · · · aK,tn ] =
[
a
′1,t
n a
′2,t
n · · · a
′K,t
n
]‖·‖2
An
, (34)
where κn is the stepsize and [v]‖·‖2An denotes the projection of the vector v onto user n’s action set An with
respect to the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2. If κn is chosen to be sufficiently small, gradient play approximates
the continuous-time gradient projection algorithm. For each nonnegative vector κ = [κ1 . . . κN ], define
g(a,κ) = [κ1∇1u1(a) κ2∇2u2(a) . . . κN∇NuN (a)]T . (35)
The definition of DSC in [7] is that, for fixed κ > 0 and every a0,a1 ∈ A, we have
(a1 − a0)T g(a0,κ) + (a0 − a1)T g(a1,κ) > 0. (36)
A sufficient condition for DSC is that the symmetric matrix G(a,κ) +GT (a,κ) be negative definite for
a ∈ A, where G(a,κ) is the Jacobian with respect to a of g(a,κ).
However, when using gradient play to search for a pure NE, the stepsize κn needs to be carefully chosen
and set to be sufficiently small, which usually slows down the rate of convergence. As an alternative
distributed algorithm, for concave games with An = R+, ∀n ∈ N , Gabay and Moulin provided in [24]
a dominance solvability condition under which best response dynamics globally converges to a unique
NE. Specifically, the dominance solvability condition is given by
− ∂
2un
∂2an
≥
∑
m6=n
∣∣∣ ∂2un
∂an∂am
∣∣∣. (37)
The sufficient conditions provided in this section and Gabay’s dominance solvability condition specify the
convergence conditions of best response dynamics in different subclasses of concave games. Specifically,
our results are developed for concave games in which every user has a multi-dimensional action space
subject to a single sum-constraint and Gabay’s dominance solvability condition is proposed for concave
games with single dimensional strategy.
D. Connections to Linearly Coupled Communication Games
We investigated in [29] the convergence properties in certain communication scenarios, namely linearly
coupled communication games (LCCG), in which each user has a convex action set An ⊆ R+ and the
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TABLE III
A SUMMARY OF VARIOUS CONVERGENCE CONDITIONS IN CONCAVE GAMES.
Algorithms Sufficient conditions and the applicable games
Gradient play Rosen’s DSC conditions for concave games [7]
Best response
Gabay’s dominance solvability condition for concave games
with An = R+ [24], conditions (C1)-(C6) for ACSCG
utility functions take the form
un(a) = a
βn
n · (µ−
N∑
m=1
τmam). (38)
It has been used to model the flow control mechanism in communication networks [30]. In best response
dynamics, at stage t, user n chooses its action according to
Bn(a
t−1) =
βn(µ−
∑
m∈N\{n} τma
t−1
m )
τn(1 + βn)
. (39)
We can see that, LCCG is similar to ACSCG in the sense that the best response iterations at stage t
in (14) and (39) both contain the linear combinations of at−1. However, since An ⊆ R in LCCG, we
can explicitly derive the Jacobian matrix for best response dynamics and determine the exact locations
of all its eigenvalues. Consequently, we are able to develop the necessary and sufficient condition that
ensures the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix to be less than 1 and best response dynamics globally
converges. However, in ACSCG, due to the sum-constraint, there exists a non-linear operation [x]ab in
equation (14). This complicates the analysis of the Jacobian matrix’s eigenvalues. Therefore, we usually
choose various appropriate matrix norms to bound the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix and ensure
the best response iteration to converge under these matrix norms. This approach generally results in
various sufficient, but not necessary, conditions.
IV. SCENARIO II: MESSAGE EXCHANGE AMONG USERS
In this section, our objective is to coordinate the users’ actions in ACSCG to maximize the overall
performance of the system, measured in terms of their total utilities, in a distributed fashion. Specifically,
the optimization problem we want to solve is
max
a∈A
N∑
n=1
un(a). (40)
We will study two distributed algorithms in which the participating users exchange price signals that
indicate the “cost” or “benefit” that its action causes to the other users. Allocating network resources via
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pricing has been well-investigated for convex NUM problems [15], where the original NUM problem
can be decomposed into distributedly solvable subproblems by setting price for each constraint resource,
and each subproblem has to decide the amount of resources to be used depending on the charged price.
However, unlike in the conventional convex NUM, pricing mechanisms may not be immediately applicable
in ACSCG if the objective in (40) is not jointly concave in a. Therefore, we are interested in characterizing
the convergence condition of different pricing algorithms in ACSCG.
We know that for any local maximum a∗ of problem (40), there exist Lagrange multipliers λn, ν1n, · · · , νNn
and ν ′1n , · · · , ν ′Nn such that the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions hold for all n ∈ N :
∂un(a
∗)
∂akn
+
∑
m6=n
∂um(a
∗)
∂akn
= λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n , ∀n (41)
λn
( K∑
k=1
ak∗n −Mn
)
= 0, λn ≥ 0 (42)
νkn(a
k∗
n − amaxn,k ) = 0, ν
′k
n (a
min
n,k − ak∗n ) = 0, νkn, ν
′k
n ≥ 0. (43)
Denote pikmn user m’s marginal fluctuation in utility per unit decrease in user n’s action akn within the
kth dimension
pikmn(a
k
m, a
k
−m) = −
∂um(a)
∂akn
, (44)
which is announced by user m to user n and can be viewed as the cost charged (or compensation paid)
to user n for changing user m’s utility. Using (44), equation (41) can be rewritten as
∂un(a
∗)
∂akn
−
∑
m6=n
pikmn(a
k∗
m , a
k∗
−m) = λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n . (45)
If we assume fixed prices {pikmn} and action profile ak−n, condition (45) gives the necessary and sufficient
KKT condition of the following problem:
max
an∈An
un(a)−
K∑
k=1
akn ·
( ∑
m6=n
pikmn
)
. (46)
At an optimum, a user behaves as if it maximizes the differences between its utility minus its payment to
the other users in the network due to its impact over the other users’ utilities. Different distributed pricing
mechanisms can be developed based on the individual objective function in (46) and the convergence
conditions may also vary based on the specific action update equation.
When optimization program (40) is not convex, the pricing algorithms developed for convex NUM,
e.g. gradient and subgradient algorithms, cannot be directly applied. In the next two subsections, we
will investigate two distributed pricing mechanisms for non-convex ACSCG and provide two sufficient
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conditions that guarantee their convergence. Specifically, under these sufficient conditions, both algorithms
guarantee that the total utility is monotonically increasing until it converges to a feasible operating point
that satisfies the KKT conditions. Similarly as in Section III-A, we first assume fkn(a−n) takes the form
in (11) and users update their actions in parallel.
A. Gradient Play
The first distributed pricing algorithm that we consider is gradient play. The update iterations of gradient
play need to be properly redefined in presence of real-time information exchange. Specifically, at stage
t, users adopting this algorithm exchange price signals {pik,t−1mn } using the gradient information at stage
t− 1. Within each iteration, each user first determines the gradient of the objective in (46) based on the
price vectors {pik,t−1mn } and its own utility function un(an,at−1−n ). Then each user updates its action atn
using gradient projection algorithm according to
a
′k,t
n = a
k,t−1
n + κ
(∂un(an,at−1−n )
∂akn
−
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)
. (47)
and
atn = [a
1,t
n a
2,t
n · · · aK,tn ] =
[
a
′1,t
n a
′2,t
n · · · a
′K,t
n
]‖·‖2
An
. (48)
in which the stepsize κ > 0. The following theorem provides a sufficient condition under which gradient
play will converge monotonically provided that we choose small enough constant stepsize κ.
Theorem 7: If ∀n, k,x,y ∈ A−n,
inf
x
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x
> −∞, and
∥∥∥▽ gkn(x)−▽gkn(y)∥∥∥ ≤ L′∥∥x− y∥∥, (C7)
gradient play converges for a small enough stepsize κ.
Proof : This theorem can be proved by showing the gradient of the objective function in (40) is Lipschitz
continuous and applying Proposition 3.4 in [31]. See Appendix E for details. 
Remark 7: (Application of condition (C7)) A sufficient condition that guarantees the convergence
of distributed gradient projection algorithm is the Lipschitz continuity of the gradient of the objective
function in (40). For example, in the power control problem in multi-channel networks [21], we have
hkn(x) = log2(α
k
n + H
k
nnx) and gkn(P−n) = log2(σkn +
∑
m6=nH
k
mnP
k
m). For this configuration, we can
immediately verify that condition (C7) is satisfied. Therefore, gradient play can be applied. Moreover, as
in [21], if we can further ensure that the problem in (40) is convex for some particular utility functions,
gradient play converges to the unique optimal solution of (40) at which achieving KKT conditions implies
global optimality.
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B. Jacobi Update
We consider another alternative strategy update mechanism called Jacobi update [32]. In Jacobi update,
every user adjusts its action gradually towards the best response strategy. Specifically, the maximizer of
problem (46) takes the following form
B
′k
n (a−n) =
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pikmn
)− ∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m, (49)
in which λn, νkn, and ν
′k
n are the Lagrange multipliers that satisfy complementary slackness in (42) and
(43), and pikmn is defined in (44). In Jacobi update, at stage t, user n chooses its action according to
ak,tn = a
k,t−1
n + κ
[
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
]
, (50)
in which the stepsize κ ∈ (0, 1]. The following theorem establishes a sufficient convergence condition
for Jacobi update.
Theorem 8: If ∀n, k,x,y ∈ A−n,
inf
x
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x
> −∞, sup
x
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x
< 0, and
∥∥∥▽ gkn(x)−▽gkn(y)∥∥∥ ≤ L′∥∥x− y∥∥, (C8)
Jacobi update converges if the stepsize κ is sufficiently small.
Proof : This can be proved using the descent lemma and the mean value theorem. The details of the
proof are provided in Appendix F. 
Remark 8: (Relation between condition (C8) and the result in [22]) Shi et al. considered the power
allocation for multi-carrier wireless networks with non-separable utilities. Specifically, un(·) takes the
form
un(P) = ri
(
K∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
HknnP
k
n
σkn +
∑
m6=nH
k
mnP
k
m
))
, (51)
in which ri(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function. Since the utilities are non-separable, the
distributed pricing algorithm proposed in [22], which in fact belongs to Jacobi update, requires only
one user to update its action profile at each stage while keeping the remaining users’ action fixed. The
condition in (C8) gives the convergence condition of the same algorithm in ACSCG. We prove in Theorem
7 that, if the utilities are separable, convergence can still be achieved even if these users update their
actions at the same time. Therefore, we do not need an arbitrator to select the single user that updates
its action at each stage.
Remark 9: (Complexity of signaling) The complexity of message exchange measured in terms of the
number of price signals to update in (44) is generally of the order of O(KN2). It is worth mentioning
that the amount of signaling can be further reduced to O(KN) in the scenarios where gkn(·) are functions
24
of
∑
m6=n F
k
mna
k
m. In this case, each user only needs to announce one price signal pikn for each dimension
of its action space:
pikn(a
k
n, a
k
−n) = −
∂un(a)
∂
(∑
m6=n F
k
mna
k
m
) (52)
Consequently, pikmn can be determined based on pikmn = F knmpikm, which greatly reduces the overhead of
signaling requirement. It is straightforward to check that only O(KN) messages need to be generated
and exchanged per iteration in both utility functions (5) and (6).
Remark 10: (Extension to general cases) As a matter of fact, conditions (C7) and (C8) apply to a
broader class of multi-user interaction scenarios, including the general model defined in (4). Specifically,
as addressed in Remark 7, the Lipschitz continuity of the gradient of
∑N
n=1 un(a) is sufficient to guarantee
that gradient play with a small enough stepsize achieves an operating point at which KKT conditions are
satisfied. In addition, we can use the same technique in Appendix F to show the convergence of Jacobi
update given that supx
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x < 0, ∀n, k, and the gradient of
∑N
n=1 un(a) is Lipschitz continuous.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In Section II-C, we present several illustrative examples of ACSCG. This section uses Examples 1 and
3 to illustrate the various distributed algorithms discussed in the paper.
We start with Example 1 to verify the proposed convergence conditions of best response dynamics. Even
though it is a simple two-user game with An ⊆ R2, existing results in the literature cannot immediately
determine whether or not the best response dynamics in this simple game can globally converge to a NE.
Specifically, in Example 1, we have
∂f1n(a−n)
∂a1−n
=
a1−n√
(a1−n)
2 + 1
,
∂f1n(a−n)
∂a2−n
= − a
2
−n√
(a2−n)
2 + 1
,
∂f2n(a−n)
∂a1−n
= − a
1
−n√
(a1−n)
2 + 1
,
∂f2n(a−n)
∂a2−n
=
a2−n√
(a2−n)
2 + 1
.
(53)
According the definition of (27), we have
[T¯max]12 = max
{
maxa∈A
∑K
k=1
∣∣∣∂fk2 (a−n)∂a11
∣∣∣,maxa∈A∑Kk=1 ∣∣∣∂fk2 (a−n)∂a21
∣∣∣}
= max
{
maxa1∈A1
2a11√
(a11)
2+1
,maxa1∈A1
2a21√
(a21)
2+1
}
= 2M1√
M21+1
.
(54)
Similarly, we can obtain [T¯max]21 = 2M2√
M22+1
. Therefore, ρ(T¯max) =
√
4M1M2√
M21+1
√
M22+1
. It is easy to show
that ρ(T¯max) < 1⇔ (M21− 13)(M21− 13 ) < 49 . By condition (C4), we know that if (M21− 13 )(M21− 13) < 49 ,
the best response dynamics is guaranteed to converge to a unique NE. We numerically simulate a scenario
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Fig. 2. Actions versus iterations in Example 1.
with parameters M1 = 23 and M2 = 1 in which condition (C4) holds. We generate multiple initial action
profiles of a01 and a02, iterate the best response dynamics, and obtain the action sequences at1 and at2.
Fig. 2 shows the trajectories of a1,t1 and a1,t2 for different realizations. We can see that, best response
dynamics converges to a unique NE. If we set M1 = 2 and M2 = 1, condition (C4) does not hold
any more. We observe from simulations that in many circumstances the best response dynamics will not
converge, which agrees with our analysis in Remark 6.
Now we consider Example 3, which is the problem of minimizing queueing delays in a Jackson
network. In particular, we consider a network with N = 5 nodes and K = 3 traffic classes. The total
routing probability 1− rkm0 that node m will route packets of class k completing service to other nodes
is the same for ∀m ∈ N . We varied the total routing probability 1 − rkm0 and generated multiple sets
of network parameters in which rkmn are uniformly distributed for n = 1, 2, · · · , N , µkn are uniformly
selected in [4, 5] for ∀n, k, and ψminn are uniformly chosen in [0.6, 1] for n = 1, 2, · · · , N .
First of all, we compare the range of validity of the proposed convergence conditions. As we mentioned
before, we have F kmn =
[(I−Rk)−1]nm
[(I−Rk)−1]nn in this example. Note that (I − Rk)−1 = I +
∑∞
i=1(R
k)i and Rk
is a non-negative matrix. Therefore, we can conclude F kmn ≥ 0,∀m 6= n, k. Moreover, since hkn(x) =
− 1µkn−υknnx , we choose to compare conditions (C2) and (C3). In Fig. 3, we plot the probability that
conditions (C2) and (C3) are satisfied versus the total routing probability 1 − rkm0. From Fig. 3, we
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Fig. 3. Probability of (C2) and (C3) versus 1− rkm0 for ∀m, k, N = 5, K = 3.
can see that the probability of guaranteeing convergence decreases as the routing probability 1 − rkm0
increases and condition (C3) shows a similar but slightly broader validity than (C2). Fig. 4 shows the delay
trajectories of three nodes using both sequential and parallel updates in a certain network realization in
which (C2) and (C3) are satisfied. We can see that, the parallel update converges faster than the sequential
update.
In Fig. 3, we also note that the probability that (C2) or (C3) is satisfied transits very quickly from the
almost certain convergence to the non-convergence guarantee as 1− rkm0 varies from 0.5 to 0.58. Similar
observations have been drawn in the multi-channel power control problem [20], where θ = −1 in (20) and
the probability that condition (C3) is satisfied exhibits a neat threshold behavior as the ratio between the
source-interferer distance and the source-destination distance varies. In Jackson networks, this threshold
can be roughly estimated. Define [Sk]mn = F kmn for m 6= n and [Sk]nn = 0 for n ∈ N . If we fix 1− rkm0
for ∀m,k, we prove in Appendix G that ρ(Sk) ≤ 1
rkm0
− 1 for ∀k. Therefore, ρ(Sk) < 1 when rkm0 > 0.5.
We would like to estimate ρ(Tmax) and ρ(Smax) based on ρ(Sk). Note that Tmax defined in (18) is the
element-wise maximum over Sk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Since Tmax and Sk are all non-negative matrices,
we know that ρ(Tmax) ≥ maxk ρ(Sk). In addition, recall the effect of maxm,n ζmn discussed in Remark
4. We can approximate ρ(Smax) defined in (22) using ρ(Smax) ≈ maxm,n ζmnmaxk ρ(Sk). Therefore,
we expect that ρ(Tmax) and ρ(Smax) exceeds 1 for rkm0 < 0.5, which agrees with our observation from
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Fig. 3. The physical interpretation is that, if the packets exit the network with a probability less than
50% after completing its service, i.e. more than half of the served packets will be routed to other nodes,
the strength of the mutual coupling among users becomes too strong and the multi-user interaction in
Jackson networks will gradually lose its convergence guarantee.
In addition, we numerically compare two distributed algorithms in which users pass coordination
messages in real time, including Jacobi update and gradient play. Fig. 5 shows the delay evolution of
both distributed solutions for a particular simulated network in which we set κ = 0.2. We initialize
the system parameters such that infn,k µkn −
∑N
m=1 υ
k
mnψ
k
m > 0 and both conditions (C7) and (C8) are
satisfied. We can verify that for Example 3, problem (40) is in fact a convex program. Therefore, there
exists a unique operating point at which KKT conditions (41)-(43) are satisfied. We can see that, both
algorithms cause the total delay to monotonically decrease until it reaches the same performance limit
that is strictly better than NE. Using the same stepsize κ, Jacobi update converges more quickly than
gradient play in this example. Similar observations are drawn in the other simulated examples. This is
because the update directions of these two algorithms are different. Jacobi update moves directly towards
the optimal solution of (46), which is a local approximation of the original optimization program in (40),
whereas the gradient play algorithm simply updates the actions along the gradient direction of (40).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose and investigate a new game model, which we refer to as additively coupled
sum constrained games, in which each player is subject to a sum constraint and its utility is additively
impacted by the remaining users’ actions. The convergence properties of various generic distributed
adjustment algorithms, including best response, gradient play, and Jacobi update, have been investigated.
The sufficient conditions obtained in this paper generalize the existing results developed in the multi-
channel power control problem and can be extended to other applications that belong to ACSCG.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The following lemma is needed to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Consider any non-decreasing function p(x) and non-increasing function q(x). If there exists
a unique x∗ such that p(x∗) = q(x∗), and the functions p(x) and q(x) are strictly increasing and strictly
decreasing at x = x∗ respectively, then x∗ = argminx{max{p(x), q(x)}}.
Proof of Lemma 1: See Lemma 1 in [19]. 
Denote ak,tn as the action of user n in the kth dimension after iteration t. Recall that
[
hkn
]′
(·) > 0,
for ∀n, k. Therefore, ∑Kk=1 ak,tn = Mn is satisfied at the end of any iteration t for any user n. Define
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[x]+ = max{x, 0} and [x]− = max{−x, 0}. It is straightforward to see that
K∑
k=1
[ak,tn − ak,t
′
n ]
+ =
K∑
k=1
[ak,tn − ak,t
′
n ]
−,∀n, t, t′. (55)
We also define
pn,t(x) ,
K∑
k=1
[
lkn(a
t
−n, x)− ak,tn
]−
(56)
and
qn,t(x) ,
K∑
k=1
[
lkn(a
t
−n, x)− ak,tn
]+
, (57)
in which lkn(·) is defined in (14). Since hkn(·) is a continuous increasing and strictly concave function, it
is clear that
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1
(·) is a continuous decreasing function. If pn,t(λt+1n ) 6= 0 (i.e. it has not converged),
pn,t(x) (qn,t(x), respectively) is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in x, and strictly increasing (strictly
decreasing) at x = λt+1n . From (55) it is always true that pn,t(λt+1n ) = qn,t(λt+1n ). We first prove the
convergence of the parallel update case in (17). For ∀n, we have
K∑
k=1
[ak,t+1n − ak,tn ]+
= max
{ K∑
k=1
[ak,t+1n − ak,tn ]+,
K∑
k=1
[ak,t+1n − ak,tn ]−
}
(58)
= max{pn,t(λt+1n ), qn,t(λt+1n )} (59)
≤ max{pn,t(λtn), qn,t(λtn)} (60)
≤ max
{ K∑
k=1
[ ∑
m6=n
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]+
,
K∑
k=1
[ ∑
m6=n
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]−}
(61)
≤ max
{ K∑
k=1
∑
m6=n
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]+
,
K∑
k=1
∑
m6=n
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]−}
(62)
= max
{ ∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]+
,
∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]−}
(63)
≤
∑
m6=n
max
k
|F kmn| ·
{ K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
+
K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]−}
(64)
=
∑
m6=n
2max
k
|F kmn| ·
K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
, (65)
where (58) and (65) follows from (55), (59) follows from the definition of pn,t and qn,t in (56) and
(57), (60) is due to Lemma 1 in which x = λtn, (61) follows from the definition of pn,t and qn,t, the
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expression of ak,tn in (17), and the fact that
[
[x]ba − [y]ba
]+ ≤ [x − y]+ and [[x]ba − [y]ba]− ≤ [x − y]−,
(62) is due to the fact that [x + y]+ ≤ [x]+ + [y]+ and [x + y]− ≤ [x]− + [y]−, (64) follows by using
[
∑
k xkyk]
+ ≤ ∑k |xk||yk| = ∑k |xk|([yk]+ + [yk]−) ≤ maxk |xk|∑k([yk]+ + [yk]−). For user n, we
define that etn =
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
. Inequality (65) can be written as et+1n ≤
∑
m6=n[T
max]mne
t
m in which
Tmax is defined in (18).
Since Tmax is a nonnegative matrix, by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem [31], there exists a positive
vector w¯ = [w¯1 . . . w¯N ] such that
‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat = ρ(Tmax), (66)
where ‖ · ‖w¯∞,mat is the weighted maximum matrix norm defined as
‖A‖w¯∞,mat , max
i=1,2,··· ,N
1
w¯i
N∑
j=1
[A]ijw¯j, A ∈ RN×N . (67)
Define the vectors et+1 , [et+11 , e
t+1
2 , . . . , e
t+1
N ]
T and et , [et1, et2, . . . , etN ]T . The set of inequalities in
(65) can be expressed in the vector form as 0 ≤ et+1 ≤ Tmaxet. By choosing the vector w¯ that satisfies
‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat = ρ(Tmax) and applying the infinity norm ‖ · ‖w¯∞, we obtain the following
‖et+1‖w¯∞ ≤ 2‖Tmaxet‖w¯∞ ≤ 2‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat‖et‖w¯∞, (68)
Finally, based on (65) and (68), it follows that
max
n∈N
et+1n
w¯n
= ‖et+1‖w¯∞ ≤ 2‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat‖et‖w¯∞ ≤ 2‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat ·max
n∈N
etn
w¯n
= 2ρ(Tmax) ·max
n∈N
etn
w¯n
(69)
Therefore, if ‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat = ρ(Tmax) < 12 , the best response dynamics in (17) is a contraction with the
modulus ‖Tmax‖w¯∞,mat with respect to the norm maxn∈N ‖·‖
wn
2
w¯n
. We can conclude that, the best response
dynamics has a unique fixed point a∗ and, given any initial value a0, the update sequence
{
at
}
converges
to the fixed point a∗.
In the sequential update case, the convergence result can be established by using the proposition 1.4
in [31]. The key step is to obtain
max
n∈N
et+1n
w¯n
≤ 2ρ(Tmax) ·max
{
max
j<n
et+1j
w¯j
,max
j≥n
etj
w¯j
}
. (70)
A simple induction on n yields
max
n∈N
et+1n
w¯n
≤ 2ρ(Tmax) ·max
n∈N
etn
w¯n
(71)
for all n. Therefore, inequality (65) also holds for the sequential update and the contraction iteration
globally converges to a unique equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
If F kmn ≥ 0,∀m 6= n, k, the inequalities after (63) become
max
{ ∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]+
,
∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]−}
(72)
≤
∑
m6=n
max
k
F kmn ·max
{ K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
,
K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]−}
(73)
=
∑
m6=n
max
k
F kmn ·
K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
. (74)
Similarly, for F kmn ≤ 0,∀m 6= n, k, we have
max
{ ∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]+
,
∑
m6=n
K∑
k=1
[
F kmn(a
k,t
m − ak,t−1m )
]−}
(75)
≤
∑
m6=n
max
k
{−F kmn} ·max{ K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
,
K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]−}
(76)
=
∑
m6=n
max
k
{−F kmn} · K∑
k=1
[
ak,tm − ak,t−1m
]+
. (77)
Therefore, if F kmn ≥ 0,∀m 6= n, k or F kmn ≤ 0,∀m 6= n, k, given (C2), the sequence {atn} contracts with
the modulus ρ(Tmax) < 1 under the norm maxn∈N
∑
k
[xkn]
+
w¯n
and the convergence follows readily. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let ‖·‖w2 denote the weighted Euclidean norm with weights w = [w1 . . . wK ]T , i.e. ‖x‖w2 , (
∑
iwi|xi|2)1/2
[33]. Define the simplex
S ,
{
x ∈ RK : 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk = 1, x
min
k ≤ xk ≤ xmaxk , ∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
. (78)
in which
∑
k x
max
k ≥ 1. The following lemma is needed to prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 2: The projection with respect to the weighted Euclidean norm with weights w, of the K-
dimensional real vector−x0 , −[x0,1, . . . , x0,K ]T onto the simplex S defined in (78), denoted by [−x0]wS ,
is the optimal solution to the following convex optimization problem:
[−x0]wS , argmin
x∈S
∥∥x− (−x0)∥∥w2 (79)
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and takes the following form:
x∗k =
[ λ
wk
− x0,k
]xmaxk
xmink
, k = 1, . . . ,K (80)
where λ > 0 is chosen in order to satisfy the constraint 1K
∑K
k=1 x
∗
k = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: See Corollary 2 in [20]. 
For hkn(·) defined in (20), user n updates its action according to
a∗kn = l
k
n(a−n, λ
∗) =
[( 1
F knn
)1+ 1
θ · (λ∗) 1θ − α
k
n
F knn
−
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
]amaxn,k
aminn,k
. (81)
and λ∗ is chosen to satisfy
∑K
k=1 a
∗k
n = Mn. Define the vector update operator as [BR(a−n)]k , a∗kn
and the coupling vector as
[Cn(a−n)]k ,
αkn
F knn
+
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m (82)
with k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We also define
F′mn , diag
(
F 1mn, F
2
mn, . . . , F
K
mn
)
(83)
and
α
′
n ,
[ α1n
F 1nn
,
α2n
F 2nn
, . . . ,
αKn
FKnn
]T
. (84)
Therefore, the coupling vector can be alternatively rewritten as
Cn(a−n) = α′n +
∑
m6=n
F′mnam. (85)
Define a weight matrix W = [w1 . . .wN ] in which the element [W]kn is chosen according to
[W]kn = [wn]k =
(F knn)
1+ 1
α∑K
k=1(F
k
nn)
1+ 1
α
. (86)
By Lemma 2, we know that the vector update operator BRn(a−n) in (21) can be interpreted as the
projection of the coupling vector −Cn(a−n) onto user n’s action set An with respect to ‖ · ‖wn2 , i.e.
BRn(a−n) =
[−Cn(a−n)]wnAn . (87)
Given any a(1),a(2) ∈ A, we define respectively, for each user n, the weighted Euclidean distances
between these two vectors and their projected vectors using (87) as en =
∥∥a(2)n − a(1)n ∥∥wn2 and eBRn =∥∥BRn(a(1)−n)− BRn(a(2)−n)∥∥wn2 . Again, we first prove the convergence of the parallel update case in (17).
33
We have ∀n ∈ N ,
eBRn =
∥∥∥[−Cn(a(1)−n)]wnAn − [−Cn(a(2)−n)]wnAn
∥∥∥wn
2
≤
∥∥∥Cn(a(2)−n)− Cn(a(1)−n)∥∥∥wn
2
(88)
=
∥∥∥∑
m6=n
F′mna(2)m −
∑
m6=n
F′mna(1)m
∥∥∥wn
2
=
∥∥∥∑
m6=n
F′mn
(
a(2)m − a(1)m
)∥∥∥wn
2
(89)
≤
∑
m6=n
∥∥∥F′mn(a(2)m − a(1)m )∥∥∥wn
2
=
∑
m6=n
√√√√ K∑
k=1
[wn]k
(
[F′mn]kk
)2(
a
(2)k
m − a(1)km
)2
(90)
=
∑
m6=n
√√√√ K∑
k=1
[wm]k
(
[F′mn]kk
[wn]k
[wm]k
)2(
a
(2)k
m − a(1)km
)2
(91)
≤
∑
m6=n
max
k
(∣∣[F′mn]kk∣∣ · [wn]k[wm]k
)√√√√ K∑
k=1
[wm]k
(
a
(2)k
m − a(1)km
)2
(92)
=
∑
m6=n
max
k
(∣∣[F′mn]kk∣∣ · [wn]k[wm]k
)∥∥a(2)m − a(1)m ∥∥wm2 (93)
=
∑
m6=n
[Smax]mnem, (94)
where (88) follows from the non-expansion property of the projector [·]wnAn in the norm ‖ · ‖wn2 (See
Proposition 3.2(c) in [31]), (90) follows from the triangle inequality [33], and Smax in (94) is defined
according to (22).
The rest of the proof is similar as the proof after equation (65) in Appendix A. Details are omitted
due to space limitations. 
34
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The beginning part of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1. For any user n with general
fkn(·), the inequalities after (59) become
K∑
k=1
[ak,t+1n − ak,tn ]+ ≤ max{pn,t(λtn), qn,t(λtn)}
= max
{
K∑
k=1
[
fkn(a
t
−n)− fkn(at−1−n )
]+
,
K∑
k=1
[
fkn(a
t
−n)− fkn(at−1−n )
]−}
(95)
= max
{
K∑
k=1
[ ∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]+
,
K∑
k=1
[ ∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]−}
(96)
≤ max
{
K∑
k=1
∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
[ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]+
,
K∑
k=1
∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
[ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]−}
(97)
= max
{∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
K∑
k=1
[ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]+
,
∑
m6=n
K∑
k′=1
K∑
k=1
[ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)(a
k′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]−}
(98)
≤
∑
m6=n
{
max
k′
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)
∣∣∣
}
·
{
K∑
k′=1
[
(ak
′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]+
+
K∑
k′=1
[
(ak
′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]−}
(99)
=
∑
m6=n
2 ·
{
max
k′
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣ ∂fkn
∂ak′m
(ξt−n)
∣∣∣
}
·
K∑
k′=1
[
(ak
′,t
m − ak
′,t−1
m )
]+
(100)
where (95) follows from the definition of pn,t and qn,t and the expression of ak,tn and Bkn(a−n, λ)
in (17) and (26), (96) follows from the mean value theorem for vector-valued functions with ξt =
αat+(1−α)at−1 and α ∈ [0, 1]. By (C4), it is straightforward to show that the iteration is a contraction
by following the same arguments in Appendix A. The rest of the proof is omitted. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
The gradient play algorithm in (46) is in fact a gradient projection algorithm with constant stepsize κ.
In order to establish its convergence, we first need to prove that the gradient of the objective in (40) is
35
Lipschitz continuous, with a Lipschitz constant given by L > 0, i.e.
∥∥∥▽ ( N∑
n=1
un(x)
)−▽( N∑
n=1
un(y)
)∥∥∥ ≤ L∥∥x− y∥∥, ∀x,y ∈ A. (101)
It is known that it has the property of Lipschitz continuity if it has a Hessian bounded in the Euclidean
norm.
The Hessian matrix H of
∑N
n=1 un(a) can be decomposed into two matrices: H = H1+H2, in which
the elements of matrix H1 are
∂2
[ N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
hkn
(
akn +
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
)]
∂akm∂a
j
l
=


N∑
n=1
∂2hkn
∂2x
(
akn +
∑
m6=n
F kmna
k
m
)
F kmnF
k
ln, if k = j
0, otherwise.
(102)
with F knn = 1 and the elements of matrix H2 are
−
∂2
[ N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
gkn(a−n)
]
∂akm∂a
j
l
= −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∂2gkn(a−n)
∂akm∂a
j
l
. (103)
Recall that gkn(·) is Lipschitz continuous and it satisfies∥∥∥▽ gkn(x)−▽gkn(y)∥∥∥ ≤ L′∥∥x− y∥∥, ∀n, k,x,y ∈ A−n.
Consequently, we have ‖H2‖2 ≤ NKL′. As a result, we can estimate the Lipschitz constant L using the
following inequalities
‖H‖2 ≤ ‖H1‖2 + ‖H2‖2 ≤
√
‖H1‖1‖H1‖∞ +NKL′ ≤ sup
x,n,k
∣∣∣∂2hkn
∂2x
∣∣∣ ·max
k,l
N∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
|F kmnF kln|+NKL′.
(104)
We can choose the RHS of (104) as the Lipschitz constant L . By Proposition 3.4 in [31], we know
that if 0 < κ < 2/L, the sequence at generated by the gradient projection algorithm in (47) and (48)
converges to a limiting point at which the KKT conditions in (41)-(43) are satisfied. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
We know from the proof of Theorem 6 that, under Condition (C7), ∑Nn=1 un(a) is Lipschitz continuous
and the inequality in (101) holds. Recall that ∑Nn=1 un(x) is continuously differentiable. Therefore, by
the descent lemma [31], we have
N∑
n=1
un(x) ≥
N∑
n=1
un(y) + (x− y)T · ▽
( N∑
n=1
un(y)
) − L
2
∥∥x− y∥∥2
2
, ∀x,y ∈ A. (105)
36
Therefore, in order to prove
∑N
n=1 un(a
t) ≥∑Nn=1 un(at−1), we only need to show that
(at − at−1)T · ▽( N∑
n=1
un(a
t−1)
) ≥ L
2
∥∥at − at−1∥∥2
2
(106)
for sufficiently small κ. Substituting (50) into (106), we can see that it is equivalent to
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · ∂∑Nn=1 un(at−1)
∂ak,t−1n
≥ κ · L
2
·
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
)2
. (107)
By equation (49), we have
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n =
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)− N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m − ak,t−1n (108)
and
∂
∑N
n=1 un(a
t−1)
∂ak,t−1n
=
∂hkn
∂x
(
ak,t−1n +
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
)− ∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn . (109)
By the mean value theorem, there exists ξkn ∈ R such that
∂hkn
∂x
(
ak,t−1n +
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
)− ∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
=
∂hkn
∂x
(
ak,t−1n +
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
)− (λn + νkn − ν ′kn + ∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)
+
(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n
)
=
∂2hkn
∂2x
(ξkn) ·
{
ak,t−1n +
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m −
{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)}
+ λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n .
Multiplying (108) and (109) leads to
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · ∂∑Nn=1 un(at−1)
∂ak,t−1n
= −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∂2hkn
∂2x
(ξkn) ·
{{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)
− ak,t−1n −
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
}2
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · (λn + νkn − ν ′kn ) (110)
In the following, we differentiate two cases in which the Lagrange multipliers λn, νkn, ν
′k
n take different
values.
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First of all, if λn = νkn = ν
′k
n = 0 for all k, n, equation (110) can be simplified as
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · ∂∑Nn=1 un(at−1)
∂ak,t−1n
= −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∂2hkn
∂2x
(ξkn) ·
{{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)
− ak,t−1n −
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
}2
.
(111)
On the other hand, if λn > 0, νkn > 0, or ν
′k
n > 0 for some k, n. Due to complementary slackness in
(42) and (43), We know that
λn > 0⇒
K∑
k=1
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n ) =Mn ≥
K∑
k=1
ak,t−1n ,
νkn > 0⇒ B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n ) = a
max
n,k ≥ ak,t−1n ,
ν
′k
n > 0,⇒ B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n ) = a
min
n,k ≤ ak,t−1n .
As a result, the last term in (110) satisfy
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · (λn + νkn − ν ′kn ) = N∑
n=1
λn
K∑
k=1
(B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
νkn
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
ν
′k
n
(
ak,t−1n −B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )
) ≥ 0. (112)
Therefore, in both cases, the following inequality holds
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
B
′k
n (a
t−1
−n )− ak,t−1n
) · ∂∑Nn=1 un(at−1)
∂ak,t−1n
≥ −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
sup
x
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x
·
{{∂hkn
∂x
}−1(
λn + ν
k
n − ν
′k
n +
∑
m6=n
pik,t−1mn
)
− ak,t−1n −
N∑
m6=n
F kmna
k,t−1
m
}2
= −
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
sup
x
∂2hkn(x)
∂2x
· (B′kn (at−1−n )− ak,t−1n )2. (113)
Finally, we can conclude that the inequality in (107) holds for κ ≤ 2L · (−maxn,k supx ∂
2hkn(x)
∂2x ). Recall
that Jacobi update requires κ ∈ (0, 1]. The stepsize κ can be eventually chosen as 0 < κ ≤ min{ 2L ·
(−maxn,k supx ∂
2hkn(x)
∂2x ), 1} 
APPENDIX G
UPPER BOUND OF ρ(Sk)
Denote 1T = [1 1 · · · 1]T . If we fix 1 − rkm0 for ∀m,k, we have 1TRk = (1 − rkm0)1T . Note that
Υk = (I− Rk)−1 = I +∑∞i=1(Rk)i. We have 1TΥk = 1T (I +∑∞i=1(Rk)i) = 1T + (1− rkm0)1TΥk and
38
1TΥk = 1
1−rkm0
1T . Therefore, |Υk|1 = 1rkm0 . Since F
k
mn =
[Υk]nm
[Υk]nn
and Υk = I +
∑∞
i=1(R
k)i, we know
[Υk]nn ≥ 1 for ∀n. Denote a diagonal matrix diag(Υk) with the entries of Υk on the diagonal. Recall
that [Sk]mn = F kmn for m 6= n, and [Sk]nn = 0 for n ∈ N . We can conclude that ρ(Sk) ≤ |Sk|∞ ≤
|(Υk)T − diag(Υk)|∞ ≤ |(Υk)T |∞ − 1 = |Υk|1 − 1 = 1rkm0 − 1.
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